Cuba 111, is a documentary shot in Cuba in 1995 by Dirk Vandersypen. This documentary revealing the lives of several Cuban families in a crumbling building in Havana won a lot of attention and several TV awards for Vandersypen's work. When he died in 2000, Vandersypen left a long list of television documentaries that focused on Latin America, and of whose people he admired greatly. Currently, the Vandersypen Award is given annually to those who share the same passion for Latin America and film-making. Vandersypen is quoted as saying:
"Ultimately my concern has always been for the fate of the people themselves. It is not for me to embellish that or play the hero at their expense. I present the stories as they are: drawn from real life."
On Friday, May 25, Maria Elvira Salazar not only broke basic principles of ethics, she denied her audience the underlying message of Vandersypen's history of work.
As I watched that entire show carefully, I noticed my suspicions were being confirmed: Maria Elvira Salazar and her guests were never going to reveal the date in which the documentary was shot. The entire program went by without one mention that Cuba 111 was shot in 1995, the year in which Cuba was still recovering from a 34.8% contraction of its GDP, and 36.7% decline in GDP per capita (Perez-Lopez 2002). The only mention was that Cuba 111 was shot "some years" back. They never came close to saying that it was a decade old.
Several moments throughout the program, Salazar cut into segments of the documentary to analyze "La Realidad Cubana." The only information she gave about the video was its title and director (which she repeated more than once), but no year. But, then Salazar topped it all off when she began comparing the video with "current" pictures of the Club Havana resort, which used to be known as the Havana Biltmore Yacht and Country Club, and is now considered part of "Havana's Fifth Avenue." I say "current" because Salazar said that some anonymous person e-mailed the pictures to her, and she didn't mention a date attached to them.
Well, upon some internet surfing, I actually came upon some of the actual pictures she showed. These two pictures that were shown on Polos Opuestos last Friday are from 1955! Salazar never mentions the date, and these pictures were mixed in with more "current" pictures that show water racers on the beach.
Near the end of the show, having compared these two historically inaccurate accounts, Maria Elvira Salazar says: "Este es el gran contraste de la Cuba de hoy." (This is the great contrast of today's Cuba).
The ethical violations are clear. By denying the audience of Polos Opuestos the exact dates Cuba 111 and photos of the Club Havana resort were shot, Maria Elvira Salazar has not only debilitated judgment, she has allowed her work to progress with erroneous beliefs and false perceptions about Cuba, and has so far denied anyone to challenge or expose her errors.
Unfortunately, this is just one example of the state of affairs in Miami about issues on Cuba. Cuba, in Miami, is a horribly altered reality, mostly due to the fact that the debate relies on an incompetent dichotomous divide. By concealing the date of Cuba 111, Maria Elvira Salazar is supporting one side of an ongoing conflict over the various realities of Cuba.
[Part 3]
Thursday, May 31, 2007
The Unethical Maria Elvira Salazar (Part 1)
Last week was a very interesting week for Maria Elvira Salazar. Weekdays at 8pm, Salazar hosts a local political talk show called Polos Opuestos (Polar Opposites) on local TV station MegaTV. Its quite a hit down here in South Florida where before Spanish primetime was usually dominated by telenovelas (soap operas). But, by 2003, Salazar had shattered the telenovela supremacy and paved the way for Spanish TV political talk. Now, shows like Polos Opuestos and A Mano Limpia ("Straight Talk"/"Face to Face") are beginning to dominate Spanish primetime. A Mano Limpia is aired on channel 51 America TeVe, and has been beating the Spanish network Telemundo since late last year. Local Spanish TV station GenTV has recently jumped on this trend and introduced Ultima Palabra, a political talk show co-hosted by Ninoska Perez-Castellon from Radio Mambi.All of these programs give considerable coverage to issues about Cuba, giving far more coverage to support for US policy towards Cuba.
Maria Elvira Salazar is already known to be an adamant supporter of US policy towards Cuba, and normally describes Fidel Castro as a tyrant. She usually offers an entire show to reveal "La Realidad Cubana" (Cuban Reality) as she puts it. But this past Friday, Maria Elvira Salazar may have breached the most basic of journalistic ethics.
Beginining on Wednesday, Salazar hosted a very heated debate on her show between Joe Garcia, Chairman of Miami-Dade Democrats, and Frank Calzon, executive director of the Center for a Free Cuba. [Watch video here.] The show was finally living up to its name (which it often doesn't do). Both participants talked over each other and disputed even the most minute of details. Growing frustrations and a vocal tussle over US funds, which both recieve for their respective organizations, ended with Calzon walking out of the show within the final 10 minutes of the program. He eventually came back to give a final statement, but it was clear that he would never debate Garcia again.
Thurday's show gave the audience another impassioned debate between Juan Amador, famous father who led the Vamos a Cuba ban (and newest member of Unidad Cubana) and Pedro Rodriguez Medina, director of Combate News who opposes US policy towards Cuba. The stark differences of opinion were displayed, with both talking over each other, but with more restraint that the Calzon-Garcia debate. The following day on Radio Mambi, several regular listeners called in to congratulate Amador for his comments.
Looking back, it seems that Friday's show was a response to the debates, to even out Garcia and Medina. The topic this day was all about a documentary called Cuba 111, and Salazar had invited two men to analyze the film: Mario Fernandez Mora and Camilo Loret de Mola (so much for diversity of views on Cuba). I enjoy documentaries from Cuba and always pay close attention to them. Salazar enjoys showing documentaries on her program to present "La Realidad Cubana," but on closer inspection, Salazar has a strange way of presenting these fine films, which happen to look dated.
[Part 2]
Tuesday, May 29, 2007
[An Addendum to "Mr. Gomez"]
While still on the topic, let me add another point about the faulty analysis of Mr. Gomez.
On April 7, 2007, Mr. Gomez actually responded to one of my queries at the Stuck on the Palmetto blog. In the comments section of that day, Mr. Gomez indentified FIU sociologist
Lisandro Perez as "one of [Miami Herald's] 'go to' experts."
Confounded at the description, I challenged Mr. Gomez: "I have never seen the Miami Herald interview or quote Lisandro Perez with any consistency. I can't recall the last time, before this [topic in question], that he appeared in the Herald. What are your remarks based on?"
Mr. Gomez responded with utmost clarity and simplicity. To my astonishment, he actually presented evidence! It seems that Mr. Gomez went to his internet news database (looks like NewsBank) and did a simple search on "Lisandro Perez" for the Miami Herald, and cut and pasted the first-page results of his search (identical to the first page of my NewsBank search). He posted 9 stories. I quickly saw his reason.
But, looking back, there seems to be something that Mr. Gomez left out in his response, and it questions whether calling Perez a "go-to" expert really means anything at all. Let's examine.
Mr. Gomez, who also posts for the Herald Watch blog, definitely enlightened me on how often Lisandro Perez is mentioned in the Herald. When one does a search on NewsBank for "Lisandro Perez" in the Herald for 2006, you get 14 matches (excluding two who are for Lisandro Perez-Rey). Only14 matches for the entire year! And, Mr. Gomez posted eight of them in his reply. Does 14 mentions in the Miami Herald make Lisandro Perez a "go-to" expert? Let's compare with other Cuba experts.
When one does a NewsBank search for "Brian Latell" in the Herald for 2006 you get 17 matches. I guess Latell is also one of Miami Herald's "go-to" experts. When one does a search for "Jaime Suchlicki" you get 19 matches. We can add Suchlicki to the list too I guess.
When you search for UM's "Institute of Cuban and Cuban American Studies" (where Latell and Suchlicki work) you get 32 matches. But, a search for FIU's "Cuban Research Institute" yields only 19 matches.
So who's really The Miami Herald's "go-to" experts? Let's do a deeper search.
A search for the "Cuban Research Institute" in the Herald from 2001 to 2006 yields 65 matches. But, a search for the "Institute for Cuban and Cuban American Studies" yields 119 matches!
A search for "Lisandro Perez" from 2001 to 2006 yields 64 matches, but "Jaime Suchlicki" yields 80 matches.
Who are the Herald's "go-to" experts now?
Finally, when I do a separate search for "Jaime Suchlicki" and "Lisandro Perez" from 1996 to 2006, I get equal matches! One hundred and eleven results for both.
I don't know what methods Mr. Gomez used to describe Lisandro Perez as a "go-to" expert, but there seems to be little justification in using such a description. So why did he use it?
I think Mr. Gomez's bias is showing.
On April 7, 2007, Mr. Gomez actually responded to one of my queries at the Stuck on the Palmetto blog. In the comments section of that day, Mr. Gomez indentified FIU sociologist
Lisandro Perez as "one of [Miami Herald's] 'go to' experts."
Confounded at the description, I challenged Mr. Gomez: "I have never seen the Miami Herald interview or quote Lisandro Perez with any consistency. I can't recall the last time, before this [topic in question], that he appeared in the Herald. What are your remarks based on?"
Mr. Gomez responded with utmost clarity and simplicity. To my astonishment, he actually presented evidence! It seems that Mr. Gomez went to his internet news database (looks like NewsBank) and did a simple search on "Lisandro Perez" for the Miami Herald, and cut and pasted the first-page results of his search (identical to the first page of my NewsBank search). He posted 9 stories. I quickly saw his reason.
But, looking back, there seems to be something that Mr. Gomez left out in his response, and it questions whether calling Perez a "go-to" expert really means anything at all. Let's examine.
Mr. Gomez, who also posts for the Herald Watch blog, definitely enlightened me on how often Lisandro Perez is mentioned in the Herald. When one does a search on NewsBank for "Lisandro Perez" in the Herald for 2006, you get 14 matches (excluding two who are for Lisandro Perez-Rey). Only14 matches for the entire year! And, Mr. Gomez posted eight of them in his reply. Does 14 mentions in the Miami Herald make Lisandro Perez a "go-to" expert? Let's compare with other Cuba experts.
When one does a NewsBank search for "Brian Latell" in the Herald for 2006 you get 17 matches. I guess Latell is also one of Miami Herald's "go-to" experts. When one does a search for "Jaime Suchlicki" you get 19 matches. We can add Suchlicki to the list too I guess.
When you search for UM's "Institute of Cuban and Cuban American Studies" (where Latell and Suchlicki work) you get 32 matches. But, a search for FIU's "Cuban Research Institute" yields only 19 matches.
So who's really The Miami Herald's "go-to" experts? Let's do a deeper search.
A search for the "Cuban Research Institute" in the Herald from 2001 to 2006 yields 65 matches. But, a search for the "Institute for Cuban and Cuban American Studies" yields 119 matches!
A search for "Lisandro Perez" from 2001 to 2006 yields 64 matches, but "Jaime Suchlicki" yields 80 matches.
Who are the Herald's "go-to" experts now?
Finally, when I do a separate search for "Jaime Suchlicki" and "Lisandro Perez" from 1996 to 2006, I get equal matches! One hundred and eleven results for both.
I don't know what methods Mr. Gomez used to describe Lisandro Perez as a "go-to" expert, but there seems to be little justification in using such a description. So why did he use it?
I think Mr. Gomez's bias is showing.
Mr. Gomez's False Analysis (Part 2)
Mr. Gomez mentions that his "job [in 'account planning'] is to know what consumers are thinking and feeling." It sounds like Mr. Gomez works in the field of applied psychology, but the evidence and explanations that Mr. Gomez proceeds to give is barren of any scientific evidence. Instead, Mr. Gomez gives us a collection of his general assumptions and simple conclusions.
He mentions that "there is general psychology and behavior common to most immigrants. For example a new immigrant will probably settle where he has family or friends living." This is accurate. Mr. Gomez is describing a general phenomenon known as ethnic solidarity. Perhaps unknown to Mr. Gomez, a study done two years ago examined ethnic solidarity in the Cuban-American community in an attempt to explain the "internal divisions" of this so-called monolith. The author (Heike C. Alberts) provides some insight into possible reasons why cohort waves are responding differently in polls. She states that since the 1980's the ethnic cohesiveness of the "Cuban enclave" in Miami has decreased due to a merging with the overall US economy, increased competition with other immigrant groups, and decreased preferential treatment within Cubans. Alberts believes that "deep rifts now exist among Cubans of different refugee generations, due to different class background, values, ideologies, religious beliefs, and race."(p.246)[*]
But, Mr. Gomez prefers to give his own interpretation based on his experiences alone, not scientific research. He most likely agrees that there are "internal divisions" within the Cuban-American community, but seems to be in denial over whether these divisions are authentic. Over time Mr. Gomez believes that "[t]here is a slow discovery process in which the [new Cuban immigrant] begins to, perhaps for the first time, reflect on the veracity (or lack thereof) of what the regime told them during their formative years... But eventually that exhaustion wears off and certain realities set in." Mr. Gomez then concludes that "[i]t’s far more likely that those younger Cubans [from the July 31 celebrations] will become more outspoken and intransigent than their forerunners." And, that newly arrived Cubans will also assume an "outspoken and intransigent" stance once they assimilate in Miami and watch the local Spanish channels, such as the increasingly popular America TeVe and Mega TV.
I have never heard of this "slow discovery process" theory, and neither does Mr. Gomez provide any evidence to support it.
Yet, Mr. Gomez is correct in stating that a "static model" for how people think is incompetent. But, I have never seen anyone (Ana Menendez or Joe Garcia) argue that the "static model" is appropriate. This is Mr. Gomez's false argument.
On the other hand, many have cited the FIU Cuba Poll to examine past and current attitudes of Cuban-Americans. Evidently, Mr. Gomez is arguing about a possible future which is likely, or not likely, to happen. Mr. Gomez offers no evidence to support his prediction, instead he only has faith that Cubans in Miami will become "more outspoken or intransigent." Only time will tell.
But, of course, Mr. Gomez would have a difficult time challenging the methodology and results of the FIU Cuba Poll or the Bendixen Poll. This may explain why he argues against interpretations and false arguments, not facts.
Guillermo Grenier, one of the principle authors of the FIU Cuba Poll, has written extensively on the factors explaining the growing political diversity within Cuban-Americans. In a 2004 study, Grenier attributed the growth of a stronger dissident movement in Cuba, unique immigration experiences of wave cohorts, political abandonment of the Cuba issue, and the natural passing away of a hard-line "exile ideology" as factors in political changes in Miami.
In 2006, Grenier added more factors to consider: the general political "relaxation" after the end of the Cold War, political diversity from new Cuban-American political groups, and Cubans living outside of South Florida (Cubans in New Jersey are more likely to favor a "national dialogue" with the Cuban government).
These are arguments that are supported by facts. Grenier never suggests a "static model." In fact, Mr. Gomez's "slow discovery process" theory may be accurate, but operating against its own inventor.
Comparing the 2000 FIU Cuba Poll with the 2007 Poll, one reaches a startling conclusion. On the question of a "national dialogue," Cubans who immigrated between 1974-1984 changed their minds in support from 40.2% in 2000, to 50.4 in 2007! That's some "slow discovery." And, about those young Cubans that Mr. Gomez mentions... they (US born Cubans) support a "national dialogue" more than ever! From 67.9% in 2000, to 82.5% in 2007! I guess living in Miami with that "historic exile" community does that to you.
There's plenty of more data to go over and interpret. But, the real question is: who's peddling a myth?
[*]Alberts, H. C. (2005). Changes in ethnic solidarity in Cuban Miami. The Geographical Review, 95, 231-248.
[Part 1]
He mentions that "there is general psychology and behavior common to most immigrants. For example a new immigrant will probably settle where he has family or friends living." This is accurate. Mr. Gomez is describing a general phenomenon known as ethnic solidarity. Perhaps unknown to Mr. Gomez, a study done two years ago examined ethnic solidarity in the Cuban-American community in an attempt to explain the "internal divisions" of this so-called monolith. The author (Heike C. Alberts) provides some insight into possible reasons why cohort waves are responding differently in polls. She states that since the 1980's the ethnic cohesiveness of the "Cuban enclave" in Miami has decreased due to a merging with the overall US economy, increased competition with other immigrant groups, and decreased preferential treatment within Cubans. Alberts believes that "deep rifts now exist among Cubans of different refugee generations, due to different class background, values, ideologies, religious beliefs, and race."(p.246)[*]
But, Mr. Gomez prefers to give his own interpretation based on his experiences alone, not scientific research. He most likely agrees that there are "internal divisions" within the Cuban-American community, but seems to be in denial over whether these divisions are authentic. Over time Mr. Gomez believes that "[t]here is a slow discovery process in which the [new Cuban immigrant] begins to, perhaps for the first time, reflect on the veracity (or lack thereof) of what the regime told them during their formative years... But eventually that exhaustion wears off and certain realities set in." Mr. Gomez then concludes that "[i]t’s far more likely that those younger Cubans [from the July 31 celebrations] will become more outspoken and intransigent than their forerunners." And, that newly arrived Cubans will also assume an "outspoken and intransigent" stance once they assimilate in Miami and watch the local Spanish channels, such as the increasingly popular America TeVe and Mega TV.
I have never heard of this "slow discovery process" theory, and neither does Mr. Gomez provide any evidence to support it.
Yet, Mr. Gomez is correct in stating that a "static model" for how people think is incompetent. But, I have never seen anyone (Ana Menendez or Joe Garcia) argue that the "static model" is appropriate. This is Mr. Gomez's false argument.
On the other hand, many have cited the FIU Cuba Poll to examine past and current attitudes of Cuban-Americans. Evidently, Mr. Gomez is arguing about a possible future which is likely, or not likely, to happen. Mr. Gomez offers no evidence to support his prediction, instead he only has faith that Cubans in Miami will become "more outspoken or intransigent." Only time will tell.
But, of course, Mr. Gomez would have a difficult time challenging the methodology and results of the FIU Cuba Poll or the Bendixen Poll. This may explain why he argues against interpretations and false arguments, not facts.
Guillermo Grenier, one of the principle authors of the FIU Cuba Poll, has written extensively on the factors explaining the growing political diversity within Cuban-Americans. In a 2004 study, Grenier attributed the growth of a stronger dissident movement in Cuba, unique immigration experiences of wave cohorts, political abandonment of the Cuba issue, and the natural passing away of a hard-line "exile ideology" as factors in political changes in Miami.
In 2006, Grenier added more factors to consider: the general political "relaxation" after the end of the Cold War, political diversity from new Cuban-American political groups, and Cubans living outside of South Florida (Cubans in New Jersey are more likely to favor a "national dialogue" with the Cuban government).
These are arguments that are supported by facts. Grenier never suggests a "static model." In fact, Mr. Gomez's "slow discovery process" theory may be accurate, but operating against its own inventor.
Comparing the 2000 FIU Cuba Poll with the 2007 Poll, one reaches a startling conclusion. On the question of a "national dialogue," Cubans who immigrated between 1974-1984 changed their minds in support from 40.2% in 2000, to 50.4 in 2007! That's some "slow discovery." And, about those young Cubans that Mr. Gomez mentions... they (US born Cubans) support a "national dialogue" more than ever! From 67.9% in 2000, to 82.5% in 2007! I guess living in Miami with that "historic exile" community does that to you.
There's plenty of more data to go over and interpret. But, the real question is: who's peddling a myth?
[*]Alberts, H. C. (2005). Changes in ethnic solidarity in Cuban Miami. The Geographical Review, 95, 231-248.
[Part 1]
Mr. Gomez's False Analysis (Part 1)
On May 16, 2007, Henry Gomez from the Babalu Blog wrote a lengthy post titled "The Peddling of a Myth." Mr. Gomez, provoked by a Miami Herald (Ana Menendez) column published that day, argues that a "miniscule [sic] Cuban-American left" (of whom Mr. Gomez mentions Ana Menendez and Joe Garcia as examples) are perpetuating a lie: "That the historical exile community is old, that it’s losing its power and that the Cuban-American community is fractured in its thinking on the Cuba problem."
Mr. Gomez believes this lie has two functions:
- The egotistical Left "desperately want to believe that people are joining them;"
- The surreptitious Left "tell a lie so many times that it begins to be perceived as truth," and as a consequence "there are some Cuban-Americans that believe exactly what these false prophets believe."
To support his argument, Mr. Gomez says that the Left "cite surveys, which they conduct. They splice the data by date of arrival and attempt to show that the growing portion of the Cuban-American community, the most recent arrivals do not identify with the 'historical' exile community."
Mr. Gomez is obviously referring to the recent Bendixen and FIU Cuba Poll, both of which have been commented on Babalu Blog upon their release. You can read Mr. Gomez's earlier posts on Bendixen and FIU at your leisure. But, this is the first time I have seen Mr. Gomez comment on the interpretation of the waves of arrival for Cuban immigrants.
Analysis of statistical data through cohorts (what Mr. Gomez calls "splic[ing] the data") is standard practice. The wave cohorts of Cuban immigrants used by FIU and Bendixen have been used by other studies, with some variation. Some identify four waves of Cuban immigration since 1959, and others identify six. But, there isn't a hidden agenda behind this common research practice, as may be implied by Mr. Gomez.
Looking at the latest results of the FIU Cuba Poll, there were clear differences in the response of Cubans depending on their arrival to the US. On the question of a "national dialogue" (one example that Mr. Gomez mentions), the majority of Cubans (56.8%) who arrived between 1959-1964 oppose the idea of a "national dialogue among Cuban exiles, Cuban dissidents, and representatives of the Cuban government." But, among Cubans who arrived between 1985-1994, the majority (65.5%) favor a "national dialogue." Those are stark differences to interpret.
Nevertheless, Mr. Gomez believes that the Left's "analysis is flawed in one major way. They assume that these recently arrived Cubans will maintain the same ideas the[y] presently have over the rest of their lives. It’s a static model, which doesn’t account for migration away from their dialoguero ["national dialogue"] position. Logic and hard evidence would seem to dictate that this is an improbable scenario."
Let's examine Mr. Gomez's "logic and hard evidence."
[Part 2]
Mr. Gomez believes this lie has two functions:
- The egotistical Left "desperately want to believe that people are joining them;"
- The surreptitious Left "tell a lie so many times that it begins to be perceived as truth," and as a consequence "there are some Cuban-Americans that believe exactly what these false prophets believe."
To support his argument, Mr. Gomez says that the Left "cite surveys, which they conduct. They splice the data by date of arrival and attempt to show that the growing portion of the Cuban-American community, the most recent arrivals do not identify with the 'historical' exile community."
Mr. Gomez is obviously referring to the recent Bendixen and FIU Cuba Poll, both of which have been commented on Babalu Blog upon their release. You can read Mr. Gomez's earlier posts on Bendixen and FIU at your leisure. But, this is the first time I have seen Mr. Gomez comment on the interpretation of the waves of arrival for Cuban immigrants.
Analysis of statistical data through cohorts (what Mr. Gomez calls "splic[ing] the data") is standard practice. The wave cohorts of Cuban immigrants used by FIU and Bendixen have been used by other studies, with some variation. Some identify four waves of Cuban immigration since 1959, and others identify six. But, there isn't a hidden agenda behind this common research practice, as may be implied by Mr. Gomez.
Looking at the latest results of the FIU Cuba Poll, there were clear differences in the response of Cubans depending on their arrival to the US. On the question of a "national dialogue" (one example that Mr. Gomez mentions), the majority of Cubans (56.8%) who arrived between 1959-1964 oppose the idea of a "national dialogue among Cuban exiles, Cuban dissidents, and representatives of the Cuban government." But, among Cubans who arrived between 1985-1994, the majority (65.5%) favor a "national dialogue." Those are stark differences to interpret.
Nevertheless, Mr. Gomez believes that the Left's "analysis is flawed in one major way. They assume that these recently arrived Cubans will maintain the same ideas the[y] presently have over the rest of their lives. It’s a static model, which doesn’t account for migration away from their dialoguero ["national dialogue"] position. Logic and hard evidence would seem to dictate that this is an improbable scenario."
Let's examine Mr. Gomez's "logic and hard evidence."
[Part 2]
Friday, May 25, 2007
The Miami Herald's Puzzle (Part 4)
Part Three of the Cuba Puzzle ends with a look at Cuba's current foreign relations. In my opinion, it is the most balanced article in the entire three-part report. Pablo Bachelet produces a good summary of events that have occurred recently, and does quote at least one Cuban studies expert, William LeoGrande, Latin American policy specialist from the American University, saying "[South American countries] think the US policy of isolation is a big mistake." But, that is all we get from the Miami Herald who prefer the academic analysis of UM's Institute for Cuban and Cuban American Studies, which is essentially an arm of the US State Department.
While the Cuba Puzzle does suffer from a slanted view of Cuba after Fidel, it is nevertheless a excellent report about sentiments in Miami. There's no doubt that Gyllenhaal's wish of reaching a "wider audience" may come true, though it may only be for those interested in Miami's perspective, and not the nation's.
The "Voices" section on the Cuba Puzzle website reveals this Miami view by including 16 short interviews, almost split between opposing views on US policy, but the majority of whom are from Miami. There's plenty of extras (audio and video) on the website to absorb too.
I will end my post with an apt comment found in Part Two of the Cuba Puzzle. It comes from Yoidel, a 24 year-old cowboy from central Cuba, who says that he wishes to leave Cuba for a better life, but is committed to fighting for Cuba "until the end."
This describes well the complexity of the Cuban issue.
[Part 1] [Part 2] [Part 3]
While the Cuba Puzzle does suffer from a slanted view of Cuba after Fidel, it is nevertheless a excellent report about sentiments in Miami. There's no doubt that Gyllenhaal's wish of reaching a "wider audience" may come true, though it may only be for those interested in Miami's perspective, and not the nation's.
The "Voices" section on the Cuba Puzzle website reveals this Miami view by including 16 short interviews, almost split between opposing views on US policy, but the majority of whom are from Miami. There's plenty of extras (audio and video) on the website to absorb too.
I will end my post with an apt comment found in Part Two of the Cuba Puzzle. It comes from Yoidel, a 24 year-old cowboy from central Cuba, who says that he wishes to leave Cuba for a better life, but is committed to fighting for Cuba "until the end."
This describes well the complexity of the Cuban issue.
[Part 1] [Part 2] [Part 3]
The Miami Herald's Puzzle (Part 3)
Part Two of the Cuba Puzzle, written by Frances Robles and Wilfredo Cancio Isla, is perhaps the best of all parts. This piece best represents the effort of what Anders Gyllenhaal (editor of the Cuba Puzzle) describes as a "10-day, 1,200-mile journey across the island" by the Miami Herald team.
This part provides many excellent descriptions about the current economic hardships in Cuba, which are indisputable and a sobering reminder of Cuba's rampant poverty. This piece also reminded me of the excellent 5-part journal by Carlos Frias, sports writer for the the Palm Beach Post. Frias' description of the unfortunate in Cuba, during his first trip to the island in August 2006, were vivid and powerfully sincere.
Cuba's economy has been written about extensively, by many organizations, so there is little to say about it. It's been made evident that if Cuba doesn't recover from its poor conditions, any future Cuban administration shall continue to face a growing social crisis.
But, many would confuse such dire conditions as a justifiable reason to make things worse. Despite economic frustrations by Cubans, many still are opposed to the US embargo. According to the latest poll inside Cuba (Havana and Santiago only) by the Gallup Organization, there was overwhelming support for the US as an "ideal partner" in trade. 44% percent of urban Cubans chose the US, with China and Venezuela falling right behind with a meager 17 and 15 percent.
Speaking of trade, the Cuba Puzzle also includes an extra article by Martha Brannigan reporting about American agricultural trade with Cuba. Despite US exports to Cuba reaching beyond $300 million annually, Brannigan writes that "[b]y most accounts, exports of agricultural goods will remain a fraction of what they could be so long as US restrictions remain." US rice exporters also support the fact that current trade with Cuba is but a fraction of what it could be. The main obstacles to US agricultural export are reported as working through third-party banks and difficulty in obtaining licenses and cash in advance, all due to US restrictions.
Brannigan also cites the USA Rice Federation saying that Cuba instead looks to Vietnam or China for their rice because the US is seen as "unreliable" due to restrictions on offering credit, unlike other countries.
In 2006, USA Today gave some insight into exactly how big US agricultural trade can grow to without restrictions or the US embargo. Edward Iwata, wrote that "[w]ith no embargo, agricultural officials say, U.S. food exports could grow tenfold."
[Part 4]
This part provides many excellent descriptions about the current economic hardships in Cuba, which are indisputable and a sobering reminder of Cuba's rampant poverty. This piece also reminded me of the excellent 5-part journal by Carlos Frias, sports writer for the the Palm Beach Post. Frias' description of the unfortunate in Cuba, during his first trip to the island in August 2006, were vivid and powerfully sincere.
Cuba's economy has been written about extensively, by many organizations, so there is little to say about it. It's been made evident that if Cuba doesn't recover from its poor conditions, any future Cuban administration shall continue to face a growing social crisis.
But, many would confuse such dire conditions as a justifiable reason to make things worse. Despite economic frustrations by Cubans, many still are opposed to the US embargo. According to the latest poll inside Cuba (Havana and Santiago only) by the Gallup Organization, there was overwhelming support for the US as an "ideal partner" in trade. 44% percent of urban Cubans chose the US, with China and Venezuela falling right behind with a meager 17 and 15 percent.
Speaking of trade, the Cuba Puzzle also includes an extra article by Martha Brannigan reporting about American agricultural trade with Cuba. Despite US exports to Cuba reaching beyond $300 million annually, Brannigan writes that "[b]y most accounts, exports of agricultural goods will remain a fraction of what they could be so long as US restrictions remain." US rice exporters also support the fact that current trade with Cuba is but a fraction of what it could be. The main obstacles to US agricultural export are reported as working through third-party banks and difficulty in obtaining licenses and cash in advance, all due to US restrictions.
Brannigan also cites the USA Rice Federation saying that Cuba instead looks to Vietnam or China for their rice because the US is seen as "unreliable" due to restrictions on offering credit, unlike other countries.
In 2006, USA Today gave some insight into exactly how big US agricultural trade can grow to without restrictions or the US embargo. Edward Iwata, wrote that "[w]ith no embargo, agricultural officials say, U.S. food exports could grow tenfold."
[Part 4]
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